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Kicking Our Gift Horse in the Mouth -
Arbitration and Arbitrator Bias:
Its Sources, Symptoms, and Solutions
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest in arbitration has increased dramatically over the past
decade.' As a response to this interest, courts have expanded the legal
status of arbitration.' Although arbitration is most commonly used in the
context of tort and contract proceedings, recent court decisions have
expanded arbitrati6n's scope.' For instance, arbitration is now being
applied to antitrust claims involving international transactions and"
securities matters.4
Arbitration has been heralded by our nation's courts because it
relieves their overcrowded dockets. s Proponents. of arbitration believe it
provides a qualitatively better form of.dispute resolution - a form that is
more reflective of community norms and is better tailored to the needs of
the individual disputants.6 Litigants also look favorably upon arbitration
because it is less costly,7 cumbersome, s'and intimidating9 than traditional
litigation.
Arbitration proceedings, however, can also cause grievous injustice
to disputants. When an arbitration proceeding is tainted by bias or
prejudice on the part of one or more of the members of the arbitration
panel,"0 such injustice will likely occur. It is this problem, arbitrator bias,
which prevents arbitration from realizing its full potential.
The cases and commentaries reveal two basic types of arbitrator
bias. It is useful to label the first group "personal" bias and the second*
group "contextual" bias. The purpose of this Note is to discuss these two
types of bias and to illustrate and explain how they operate to taint
arbitration proceedings.
Part II of this Note will detail the two separate arbitration systems
1. Deborah R. Hensler, Mhat We Know and Don't Know Abput Court-Administered
Arbitration, 69 JUDICATuRE 270 (1986).
2. William E. Hartgering, A Lawyer's Guide Through the Rhetoric, Myths & Potential
ofA.D.R., C.B.A. RECoRD, June 1987, at 44.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc., Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953, 954 (1986).
6. Hensler, supra note 1, at 270.
7. Richard Delgado, Fairness and Fornality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1366 (1985).
8. See Bernard J. Reilly, The President's Message, N.Y. ST. B.J., April 1983, at 5, 7.
9. See Warren E. Burger, Our Vicious Legal Spiral, 16 JUDGES J. 23, 48 (1977).
10. Gregory R. Kim, Note, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.: Unconscionability of
Presumptively Biased Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion Contracts, 70 CAL. L. REv.
1014, 1021 n.4 (1982).
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currently operating in the United States: (1) court-annexed mandatory
arbitration, and (2) voluntary contractual arbitration pursuant to private
contract and the mandates of the American Arbitration Association.
Within the context of mandatory arbitration, Part II will also specifically
and historically relate arbitration's rise in stature and will explain the
manner by which it has arrived at its present level of popularity. Part III
will relate the standards to which arbitrators are required to adhere when
hearing a case (under both systems) and will explain these two systems'
respective procedures for rejecting and vacating an award rendered by a
biased arbitration panel. Part IV will explain "personal" and "contextual"
bias and will specifically illustrate how these two biases operate to taint
arbitration proceedings. Finally, Part V will discuss how to deal with the
problem of arbitrator bias. It will explore how these two types of bias
can be best addressed. and, hopefully, combatted.
II. THE Two ARBITRATION SYSTEMS CURRENTLY
OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration
1. The Establishment and Operation of Mandatory Arbitration.
Court-annexed mandatory arbitration (hereafter mandatory
arbitration) programs are established by state statute, state supreme court
rule, or local rule." These programs authorize trial courts to compel
arbitration of civil suits that "fall within a specified jurisdictional limit, as
a precondition for placing those suits on the trial calendar."1
2
In Illinois, for example, the Supreme Court Rules (the enabling act
for the state's mandatory arbitration system) compel arbitration for all
lawsuits under $15,0002? Since the late 1950's, however, mandatory
arbitration programs have steadily increased their jurisdictional amounts. 4
In contrast to Illinois, court-induced arbitration programs in California
include most cases under $25,000.15 Moreover, several federal districts
compel arbitration for cases under $100,000 or $150,000, and some have
no jurisdictional limits.1 6
11. Hensler, supra note 1, at 271.
12. Id.
13. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 86 (this amount will soon be changed to $30,000).
14. Hartgering, supra note 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Dana H. Freyer, The Integration of A.D.R. Into Corporate Law Firm Practice,
ARB. J. (December 1990, at 6).
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The reason for the institution of these mandatory procedures, of
course, has been the dramatic increase in the number- of claims brought
for formal adjudication. 7 Over the last forty years, the number of federal
district court cases filed has increased from about 35,000 to 180,000
annually.' s The same pattern is present in our nation's state courts. For
instance, from 1967 to 1976 state trial court filings increased twice as fast
as the nation's population?9
Mandatory arbitration hearings are informal, private, and often
brief." A full hearing necessary to arrive at an award can frequently be'
reached in a few hours.2 While a 12-person jury trial 'could feasibly
arrive at a decision within 3 days, the same determination could be
completed within three hours through a state's mandatory arbitration
procedure.' These arbitration proceedings are usually not recorded and
relaxed rules of evidence are used.23 Of particular significance is that in
lieu of witnesses, medical and other written reports are sufficient as
evidence. 24
Arbitrators are appointed to these proceedings pursuant to, and in
accordance with, the particular state's mandatory arbitration statute or
rule . ' A list of possible arbitrators is compiled by the state, and a panel
17. See generally Bayless Manning, Hyperplexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L.
REv. 767 (1977).
18. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982).
19. Id.
20. Hensler, supra note 1, at 271. The following discussion also applies to voluntary,
contractual, binding arbitration proceedings.
21. ILL. Sup. CT. R. Introductory Comments at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Hensler, supra note 1, at 271.
25. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 86-94 (exemplifies a typical set of mandatory arbitration rules).
Since the Illinois set of rules represents a typical set of mandatory arbitration rules
(derived from a careful study of many other jurisdictions' rules), it will be utilized
throughout the discussion relating to appointment and qualification of arbitrators as well as
the later discussion regarding the procedure for rejecting a mandatory arbitration award and
the standard for such award's rejection.
The intention of the Committee in charge of creating Illinois' mandatory arbitration
rules was to "obtain a product refined from the use and experience of the full panoply of
models in existence" at that time.. The Committee relied particularly on Pennsylvania's
mandatory arbitration program in creating its own (as will -be discussed, Pennsylvania was
the first jurisdiction to implement a successful mandatory arbitration system). Id.,
Introductory Comments at 2.
The Illinois Committee included four judges who had previously served oft a Judicial
Conference Study Committee. These judges' recommendations served 'as the basis for the
Illinois Arbitration Act. These judges, As a result of their earlier studies, had available for
their use a "considerable bank of knowledge of existing arbitration systems." Id. The
Committee utilized these judges' knowledge of other jurisdictions' arbitration systems in
formulating Illinois' system. See id.
Moreover, "[a] national conference on mandatory arbitration sponsored by the
National Institute for Dispute Resolution held in Washington, D.C., May 29-31, 1985,
provided the chair of this Committee with a further opportunity to discuss the development
of [arbitration] programs with representatives of other jurisdictions." Id. This information
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is selected from this list. For example, a typical rule (in this instance, the
relevant Illinois Supreme Court Rule)2' on this issue reads:
Rule 87. Appointment, Qualification and Compensation of
Arbitrators
(a) List of Arbitrators. A list of arbitrators shall be prepared
in the manner prescribed by a circuit rule. The list shall consist of a
sufficient number of members of the bar engaged in the practice of
law and retired judges within the circuit in which the court is
situated.
(b) Panel. The panel of arbitrators shall Zonsist of three
members of the bar, or such lesser number as may be agreed upon
by the parties, appointed from the list of available arbitrators, as
prescribed by circuit rule, and shall be chaired by a member of the
bar who has engaged in trial practice for at least three years or by a
retired judge . ...
The arbitration panel is most frequently formed by a method of
random selection.2' Other methods include alphabetical appointment from
the list of arbitrators, appointment from the list in the order of arrival and
signing-in on the hearing date, or selection of three members with a
combined experience of ten years.29
There also exist various methods for selecting a panel chairperson.
In some jurisdictions, the member with the longest number of years in
practice is appointed chairperson.3' In other jurisdictions, a special list is
maintained as the roster for appointment of the chairperson of the panel.3'
This list consists of those arbitrators whom the arbitration administrator
believes have the most pertinent experience in practice. Once this panel
is selected and a chairperson is appointed, the mandatory proceedings
begin.
was also utilized by the Illinois Committee in formulating a viable set of mandatory
arbitration rules; a set of rules which considered, and was representative of, the types of
arbitration systems operating successfully in other jurisdictions. See id.
Lastly, the Illinois Committee's chair met with supervising judges, arbitration
administrators, and attorney practitioners in New Jersey, Pittsburgh, and Seattle in order to
discuss the effectiveness of these states' local and statewide arbitration rules. Again, these
people's input contributed to the Committee's final set of arbitration rules. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 87 committee cmt. para. (b).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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2. The Popularization of Mandatory Arbitration.
The increase in the popularity of court-annexed mandatory
arbitration, both in the state and federal systems, has been astounding.
The first court-sanctioned arbitration system was established in
"Philadelphia in 1952.3 An 18th century statute that provided for the
referral of trial cases to -arbitrators was amended in order to implement
this program.? By the -1960's, similar systems had been established all
across Pennsylvania. 3' Word of Pennsylvania's success in solving small
money damage suits quickly spread.? As soon as the early 1970's, as
many state courts were struggling to find a solution to ease their
overcrowded dockets, a number of states adopted mandatory arbitration
systems similar to the one in Pennsylvania. 37 Then, in the late 1970's and
early 1980's, a number of new states decided in favor of mandatory
arbitration and adopted their own programs. 9 By October 1985, eighteen
39states had implemented mandatory arbitration programs.
While mandatoiry arbitration began in the state courts, it was not
long before federal courts decided to experiment with similar programs.
40
Currently, ten federal district courts (to be expanded to twenty) have
33. Hensler, supra note 1, at,271.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; See generally JANE W. ADLER Er AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS
FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM, THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE (1983).
37. Hensler, supra note 1, at 271.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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court-annexed arbitration programs.4 '
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41. Hensler, supra note 1, at 271; Freyer, supra note 16, at 6. The legislative
authority for these federal arbitration programs is the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act of 1988, §§ 901-907, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1982).
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B. Voluntary Contractual Arbitration
Voluntary contractual arbitration (hereafter voluntary arbitration) is
"agreed upon" arbitration. As opposed to court-annexed, mandatory
arbitration, where the disputants have no choice but to subject their
lawsuit to arbitration, in voluntary arbitration, the parties agree by private
contract to have certain disputes, should they arise, resolved by
arbitration. The parties further agree to be bound by the arbitration
panel's decision.2u
Many contracts provide that: the arbitration described therein take
place in accordance with the rules and standards proscribed by the
American Arbitration Association. (AAA). The AAA, founded in 1926, is
a public-service, not-for-profit organization. 4  The AAA encourages
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution and administers arbitration
pro ceedings.4 The AAA offers a broad range of dispute resolution
services which are available through offices located in major cities
throughout the United States."'
From a panel of individuals compiled by the AAA, private and
public litigants select arbitrators for labor and commercial disputes.46 The
AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide for several alternative means
of selecting arbitrators.4 A typical manner of selection is for the AAA,
when administering an arbitration proceeding, to simultaneously submit to
each party an identical list of persons chosen from its panel of
arbitrators. 4 The parties to the dispute then have the opportunity to cross
potential arbitrators' names off this list. Along with this list of potential
arbitrators, the AAA sends the parties a copy of the biographical card that
each arbitrator provides to the AAA. 4 These cards assist the parties in
deciding which arbitrators to strike from the list. The parties then
indicate their order of preference among the remaining arbitrators.s"
Afterwards, the parties return their modified lists to the AAA. 5 ' As in
mandatory arbitration, once a panel is selected, the arbitration proceedings
begin.
42. See Kalish v. Illinois Ed. Ass'n, 519 N.E.2d 1031 (i1. App. 1988).
43. AM. ARB. ASS'N, ACCIDENT CLAIMS ARBITRATION RULES 2 (1989).
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id. -at 2.
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979); "The AAA has produced a Code of
Ethics and Procedural Standards for use and guidance of arbitrators." Id.
47. Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 1003 n.273.
48. W. David t'antle, The Duty of an Attorney as Arbitrator to Disclose Possible Bias,
18 COLO. LAW. 859, 862 (1989).
49. Id.
50. Id.; Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 1003-4 n.273.
51. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 13 (1982).
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Private arbitration is also encouraged by both federal and state
legislatures.-2 The Federal Arbitration Act,m for instance, provides that a
written provision or contract regarding a transaction involving commerce
shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" if such contract states that
controversies arising out of such contract or transaction are to be settled
by arbitration.-" This Act requires a federal court, when faced with an
action that the parties contractually agreed to arbitrate, to stay litigation
pending arbitration or to compel arbitration.
ss
Federal endorsement of arbitration promotes and encourages this
process as a speedy and efficient means of resolving disputesm The
United States Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in Southland Corp. v.
Keatinge' by holding that arbitration provisions are irrevocable and
enforceable as substantive federal law and that such provisions preempt
any state law that undermines the enforcement of arbitration agreements sg
III. ARBITRATORS' STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND THE PROCEDURES
FOR REJECTING AND VACATING BIAS-INDUCED AWARDS
A. Mandatory Arbitration
1. Arbitrators' Standard of Conduct.
Pursuant to rule or statute, an arbitrator must comply with a specific
standard of conduct when presiding over a mandatory arbitration
proceeding. According to the earlier-mentioned, typical rule relating to
the implementation of mandatory arbitration proceedings, an arbitrator has
a duty to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct: "Rule 87 . - . (c)
Disqualification. Upon appointment to a case, an arbitrator shall notify
the court and withdraw from the case if any grounds appear to exist for
disqualification pursuant to the Code of Judicial Conduct."s9
The section of the Code of Judicial Conduct to which the above rule
refers is Canon 3, section C: "A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His
52. See 2 WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON INSURANCE § 14:2. (6th ed. 1990); see
also Hartgering, supra note 2, at 43.
53. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
55. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
56. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1984); FREEDMAN, supra
note 52.
57. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
58. Id.; FREEDMAN, supra note 52.
59. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 87.
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[or Her]6 Office Impartially and Diligently, (C) Disqualification.' This
Canon outlines specific instances where a judge or arbitrator will become
disqualified from the proceedings because of bias (referred to in the
Canon as the inability to be "impartial").a This Canon requires a judge
or arbitrator to disqualify himself or herself from the proceedings if he or
she is tainted by bias.Y However, it is the situation where the arbitrator
does not disqualify himself or herself that is the focus of this Note.
2. Procedure for Rejecting and Vacating a Biased Award.
According to the Illinois rule, there is "no provision for a substitute
of arbitrators or change of venue from the panel or any of its members.""
The appropriate response to perceived bias or prejudice, when ari
arbitrator does not disqualify himself or herself, is to reject the award and
to proceed to trial. 6s A typical rule relating to rejection of an arbitration
award will provide that within 30 days after the filing of the award and
upon payment of a sum of money to the clerk of the court with whom the
award is filed, any party who was present at the arbitration hearing may
file a written notice of rejection of the award and request to proceed to
trial."
B. Voluntary Arbitration
1. Arbitrators' Standard of Conduct.
In arbitration proceedings administered by the AAA, arbitrators are
expected to comply with and adhere to the AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules. These rules require a person appointed as an arbitrator to disclose
to the AAA "any circumstances likely to affect impartiality, including any
bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or
any past or present relationship with the parties or their counsel."' "If
the AAA feels that the disclosure should disqualify the person from
60. The actual text reads "His."
61. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 63(3)(C) (Ill. S. Ct. Practice Rules 1987).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 87 committee cmt. para. (c).
65. Id.; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 93.
66. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 93(a). Delaware's and New Jersey's mandatory arbitration
programs also provide that the sole remedy of a party unwilling to accept an arbitration
award is to reject the award and proceed to trial. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 93 committee cmt. para.
(a). Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio provide a similar procedure relating to the rejection
of an arbitration award. Id.
67. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 19 (1982).
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serving as an arbitrator, the arbitrator will not be invited to serve."' If
the AAA feels disqualification is not necessary, it will summarize the
results of each arbitrator's disclosure and notify each party to the
dispute.69
After appointment, the arbitrators are again reminded by the AAA
that all prior or present business connections with either of the parties
must be disclosed so that the parties can either waive objections or request
another appointment.70 A failure by an arbitrator to make the necessary
disclosure may result in vacatur of any award the arbitration panel
grants. 71
2. Procedure for Rejecting and Vacating a Biased Award.
The Federal Arbitration Act (as do parallel state enabling statutes)
provides a procedure for vacating an arbitration panel's award when the
award was rendered in a biased manner. 72 Section 10 of the Act permits
"the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made [to] make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration . . . (2) Where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators . . . . "73 The complaining party must draft a
notice of motion to vacate the award and must serve this notice upon the
adverse party within three months after the award is filed or delivered.74
However, the standard of review of an arbitration award is
considerably narrower than the review of a trial judgment.7' When a
party moves to enforce an award, and the loser challenges its
enforcement, "the court [will] not review the underlying facts of the case
... . [T]he court will merely review the proceeding for minimal due
process considerations." 76  Where an award is successfully vacated,
however, the court may, in its discretion order a rehearing by the
arbitrators.'
68. Pantle, supra note 48.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Stipanowich, supra note 5, at 1003-4 n.273.
72. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
73. Id.
74. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
75. Hartgering, supra note 2, at 43.
76. Id.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(5) (1988); for a parallel state provision, see 10 I11. Rev. Stat. §
112(c) (1975).
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IV. "PERSONAL" AND "CONTEXTUAL" BIAS
If bias exists at all in an arbitration proceeding, the cases and
commentaries indicate that this bias invariably takes one of two forms.
The bias may be termed either "personal" or "contextual" bias.78 Personal
bias includes racial and ethnic bias.? The title "personal" bias is useful
because this type of bias is personal or individual to the arbitrator.
Contextual bias, on the other hand, includes types of biases arbitrators
possess because of the particular relationship in which they find
themselves with respect to one of the parties to the arbitration." In this
situation, the arbitrator is deemed to be biased due to this external
relationship.
A. Personal Bias
A number of theories have been advanced which seek to explain
racial and ethnic prejudice." The two theories which will .be examined in
this Note are those first identified by Professor Richard Delgado of the
University of Colorado School of Law: (1) psychodynamic theories, and
(2) social-psychological theoriesYv-
1. Psychodynamic Theories.
Psychodynamic theories of prejudice look to personality traits and
tendencies to explain why some people react with bias toward certain
groups of persons.? These tieories of prejudice attempt to identify
cognitive or emotional processes common to prejudiced persons."
According to these theories, persons who possess an "authoritarian
personality". appear to be more susceptible to prejudice than others. 8s An
authoritarian personality is characterized, among other things, by rigidity
and conventionality. 6  Persons with authoritarian personalities are
78. These terms, "personal" and "contextual" bias, I have developed for purposes of
this Note.
79. See generally Delgado, supra note 7.
80. See generally Pantle, supra note 48.
81. Prejudice, when used in this section of the Note, is synonymous with bias.
82. Delgado, supra note 7, at 1375.
83. Id.
84. See generally GEORGE E. SIMPSON & J. MILTON YINGER, RACIAL AND'CULTURAL
MINORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 78 (4th ed. 1972).
85. Delgado, ga4pra note 7, at 1376; THEODORE W. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN
PERSONALITY (1969).
86. Delgado, supra note 7, at 1376..
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dogmatic; they want definiteness and authority in their relationships.7
Authoritarian personalities reject groups less familiar than their own.
Because ethnic minorities may possess characteristics different from the
authoritarian personality, members of these ethnic groups become the
targets for racial bias.8'
2. Social-Psychological Theories.
Social psychologists believe that individuals learn whom to dislike in
the same way people learn group values. Social psychologists believe
biases are not innate." It'is suggested that biased attitudes emerge during
early childhood.9 Children acquire attitudes toward different people by
observing the behavior and attitudes of others, especially their parents."
Once acquired, these attitudes persist into adulthood. 92
Social psychologists also believe people have a natural tendency to
categorize. Ethnic groups satisfy this basic psychological need.9 Once
categorized, people become loyal to their own group and begin to dislike
other groups.9 Along with this dislike come barriers to communication
and stereotyping.9 Racial and ethnic minorities are seen as different and
are thus the objects of prejudice by other groups.9
B. Contextual Bias
Contextual bias is easier to understand from a legal perspective
because it does not involve psychological theory. Instead, contextual bias
exists as the result of the situation in which an arbitrator has placed him
or her or has been placed due to circumstance. Moreover, whereas
personal bias operates in all spheres of life (whether one is an arbitrator
or not), contextual bias deals specifically with arbitrators. Contextual bias
typically exists because an arbitrator has not disclosed his or her bias
(e.g., his or her previous relationship) to the disputants9 as is required by
both the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Commercial Arbitration
87. See generally ADORNO, supra note 84.
88. Delgado, supra note 7, at 1376.
89. Id.; see Thomas F. Pettigrew, Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice, 59 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 28 (1959).
90. Delgado, supra note 7, at 1380.
91. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 298 (25th anniv. ed. 1979).
92. belgado, supra note 7, at 1380.
93. ALLPORT, supra note 90, at 17.
94. Id.
95. See generally ALLPORT, supra note 90.
96. Id.
97. See Pantle, supra note 48, at 862.
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Rules."
There are a number of situations where contextual bias has been
found to exist. Of the following factual situations, the first four were
identified and categorized by W. David Pantle, a Denver attorney. The
remaining four situations were derived from "an analysis of the case law
on this issue.
1. Bias Will Exist Where the Arbitrator is the Attorney for One of
the Parties in Another Matter.99
Contextual bias clearly exists where an arbitrator, or a member of
an arbitrator's firm, represents, or has represented in another matter, a
party to the dispute.' ° Even though the.arbitrator believes he or she can
remain fair and impartial, if this circumstance is disclosed, the previously
unrepresented party to the arbitration dispute will most likely suggest this
person not serve as an arbitrator. The AAA, if the arbitration is AAA
sanctioned, will suggest likewise."'1 . Even if the arbitrator believes he or
she can remain entirely fair and impartial, this belief will usually not
overcome the presumption of bias, and the arbitrator will most "likely be
asked not to serve."
2. Bias Will Exist Where the Arbitrator Has Been Previously
Employed by One of the Parties. 3
If an arbitrator has been previously, employed by one of the parties
to the dispute, and this fact is not disclosed, the arbitration award may be
vacated for possible bias.0 4 Although the arbitrator no longer works for
the party and the grounds for the arbitrator leaving the party's
employment are not evident, the arbitrator is. nevertheless seen as
98. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 63(C) (II1. Sup. Ct. Practice R. 1987);
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 19 (1982).
99. Pantie, supra note 48, at 862.
100. Pantie, supra note 48, at 862 n.26; Egan & Sons Co. v. Mears Park Dev. Co.,
414 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); James D. Morrisey, Inc. v. Gross Const. Co., 443
A.2d 344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Bole v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 352 A.2d 472 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1975); San Luis Obispo Bay Prop., Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 733
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972); E.J. Cecil v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n., 236 P.2d
408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
101. Pantie, supra note 48, at 862.
102. Id.; Bole v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 352 A.2d 472 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
103. Pantie, supra note 48, at 862.
104. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968); School Dist. of Spooner v. Northwest- United Educators, 401 N.W.2d 578, 582
(Wis. 1987); Northwest Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 522, 524
(Minn. 1979); Egan & Sons Co. v. Mears Park Dev. Co., 414 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987).
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potentially tainted with bias. This prior employment is grounds in itself to
warrant the arbitrator's being excused."
3. Bias May Exist Where the Arbitrator, or a Member of the
Arbitrator's Firm, Has Previously Acted as Co-Counsel With
One of the Attorneys.'0o
A problem may arise where an attorney-arbitrator, or a member of
the arbitrator's firm, has, in the past, acted as co-counsel in another
dispute with one of the attorneys representing one of the parties to the
arbitration. If the arbitrator does not reveal this fact to the other party, a
court may again vacate the arbitration award."°
Further grounds for vacating an award may exist where an attorney
from the representative attorney's firm has had the assistance of
co-counsel from the arbitrator or another member of the arbitrator's
firm.lnO It may at times be difficult for the arbitrator to know whether
someone else in his or her firm has acted as co-counsel with either a
representative attorney or a member of this attorney's firm. This is a
very tenuous relationship, however, and bias is unlikely to occur. If the
arbitrator does not know of these relationships, it has been argued that
there should be no ground for the losing party to vacate the arbitration
award. '09
4. Bias Will Exist Where the Arbitrator Acts as an Advocate for
One of the Parties. 10
Where an arbitrator acts as an advocate for one of the parties, the
award may, depending on the level and extent of advocacy, be vacated."'
Sometimes an arbitrator's keen interest in a matter is misinterpreted as
bias toward one side or the other." 2  Interest in the dispute alone,
105. See generally Pantle, supra note 48.
106. Id. at 863.
107. Id.
108. Id.; Allen v. A. & W. Contractors, Inc., 433 So. 2d 839, 841 (La. Ct. App.
1983).
109. Pantie, supra note 48, at 863.
110. Id. at 864-65.
111. See generally Noffsinger v. Thompson, 54 P.2d 683 (Colo. 1936); Cassara v.
Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1951); Gaines Constr. Co. v. Carol City Util., 164 So. 2d
270, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Brennan v. Stewarts' Pharmacies, Ltd., 579 P.2d 673,
682 (Haw. 1978); Scherbenske Excavating, Inc. v. North Dakota State Highway Dept., 365
N.W.2d 485, 490 (N.D. 1985).
112. E. Arthur Tutein, Inc. v. Hudson Valley Coke & Prod. Corp., 245 N.Y.S. 125,
129 (N.Y.A.D. 1930); see also Courville v. B & B Eng. & Supply Co. 230 S.E.2d 380(N.C. 1976); E. Millins & Co. v. Regal Shirt Corp., 113 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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however, does not constitute bias."U To the contrary, interest by an
arbitrator is a positive characteristic." 4
This category of contextual bias actually focuses on the arbitration
selection process as opposed to an arbitrator's nondisclosure. This type of
bias occurs where each side to the dispute appoints an arbitrator and then
agrees on a third arbitrator. This method of appointing arbitrators differs
markedly from the earlier-mentioned AAA method." s Usually, contract
provisions provide for this method of arbitration as opposed to the
described AAA format. Typically, the appointees are biased toward, their
appointers' respective sides of the dispute. 6
Such a system of arbitrator selection is fraught with problems." 7
Usually, these attorney-appointed arbitrators are chosen after. the
representative attorney has had a chance to discuss the dispute with his or
her potential arbitrator. The representative attorney will choose a person
as an arbitrator only when th6 attorney has obtained a favorable
disposition toward his or her side of the dispute from their potential
arbitrator."' Sometimes, a party or counsel will even appoint his or her
own attorney as their arbitrator." 9
Once both sides have made their selections, and it is apparent that
these arbitrators are biased in favor of their respective selectors, the third,
neutral arbitrator is placed in a precarious position. The two biased
arbitrators now serve little function. They will typically disagree on all
arguable issues.' Moreover, the neutral arbitrator may feel hindered
from speaking freely or openly with either of them. The third arbitrator
will thus be prevented fromr thinking the dispute through in a meaningful
manner.'2 ' This method of arbitrator selection obviously -leads' to difficult
problems.
113. E. Arthur Tutein, Inc. v. Hudson Valley Coke & Prod. Corp., 245 N.Y.S. 125
(N.Y.A.D. 1930).
114. See generally id.
115. Pantie, supra note 48, at 864.
116. See Wechsler v. Gidwitz, 250 11. App. 136 (1928); see also Grambling v. Food
Machinery & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.S.C. 1957); Brennan v. Stewarts'
Pharmacies, Ltd., 579 P.2d 673 (Haw. 1978).
117. Pantle, supra note 48, at 864.
118. Id.
119. Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Ct. App. 1979); see
also Painters Dist. Council No. 33 v. Moen, 181 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1982); Dinong v.
Superior Ct., 174 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1981).
120. See generally Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp., 160 Cal. Rptr.' 303, 305 (Ct. App.
1979).
121. Pantie, supra note 48, at 864-65.
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5. Bias Will Exist Where the Arbitrator Has a Financial or
Personal Interest in the Outcome of the Dispute.
Where an arbitrator has a financial interest in the outcome of the
dispute, the award may be vacated.'2 An arbitrator has a financial
interest in an award when, for instance, the arbitrator is a stockholder in a
corporate party1m or wblen the arbitrator is a partner or silent partnertm in
a company which is a party to the dispute.
Where- it appears that an arbitrator is under the dominion and
control of a party to the arbitration, the arbitrator is presumed to be
biased in favor of that party.' 5  When an arbitrator is under the control of
one of the parties (for instance, the party is an officer of a corporation
involved in the arbitration while the arbitrator is a shareholder of this
same corporation),' 2 the arbitrator is considered to have a personal
interest in the arbitration.12 7 As one would expect, an arbitrator may not
render a decision on a matter in which he or she has a personal interest.1 2'
6. Bias Will Exist Where a Party's Attorney Has Represented the
Arbitrator or the Arbitrator's Employer in Another Matter. '
There may be problems with bias and disclosure where a party's
attorney has represented the arbitrator or the arbitrator's employer in
another matter. 30  A consideration of the closeness of the relationship
between the arbitrator and the attorney representing the party to the
immediate dispute determines whether bias exists. Clearly, an arbitrator
is presumed more biased when the party's attorney is also the arbitrator's
122. Glazer v. Diamond, 187 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Lastmor Products Mfg.
Corp. v. Storozum, 107 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 1952).
123. Gaines Constr. Co. v. Carol City Utils., Inc., 164 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964).
124. Connor v. Simpson, 7 A. 161 (Pa. 1886); DePhillips v. Keystone Ins. Co., 58 D.
& C.2d 183 (1972).
125. See Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp.. 160 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Ct. App. 1979);
see also Painters Dist. Council No. 33 v. Moen, 181 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1982); Dinong
v. Superior Ct., 174 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1981); Gaines Constr. Co. v. Carol City
Utils. Co., 164 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
126. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Canton Co., 17 A. 394 (Md. Ct. App. 1889).
127. See In re Miller, 23 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1940), reh'g denied, 24 N.Y.S.2d 982
(1940); see also In the Matter of the Arbitration between Petroleum Cargo Carriers, Ltd.
and Unitas, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1961), Giddens v. Board of Educ., 75 N.E.2d 286 (111.
1947).
128. See In re Miller, 23 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1940), reh'g denied, 24 N.Y.S.2d 982
(1940); see also In the Matter of the Arbitration between Petroleum Cargo Carriers, Ltd.
and Unitas, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1961).
129. Pantle, supra note 48, at 864.
130. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Ky. 1959).
rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).
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personal attorney, as opposed to where the party's attorney represents the
arbitrator's employer."
It has been ruled, however, that the above situations do not give rise
to arbitrator bias. For instance, it has been held that these situations
involve very tenuous relationships and that "[s]omething more than such a
vague and rather remote business relationship is needed if the losing party
seeks to vacate an award on the ground of evident partiality. "132
7. Bias May Exist Where the Arbitrator has a Familial
Relationship with One of the Parties.
Bias, interest, or partiality sometimes results when 'a familial
relationship between an arbitrator and a party to the arbitration exists.
3
An arbitrator acts in a "quasi-judicial capacity," lm and should possess the
judicial qualification of fairness to both sides so that the arbitrator may
render a faithful, honest, and disinterested opinion.'3'  A familial
relationship that would bar a judge from sitting in a trial of a case would
also apply to disqualify an arbitrator.'
Not all awards rendered by a panel where a familial relationship
exists between an arbitrator and a party, however, may be vacated.? 7 It
has been held that certain familial relationships are permissible, and the
arbitrator need not fear that the award will be vacated.L'3 For instance, a
Texas court held that only arbitrators related to a party "within the third
degree"'3' are subject to having their awards reversed for possible bias or
partiality. In Bell v. Campbell,' the arbitrator's nephew married the
sister of a- party. This far-removed familial relationship, the court
believed, was not sufficient grounds for establishing partiality and bias
based on a family relationship.'4
131. See id.
132. Id. at 128.
133. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Lusis, 492 P.2d 575 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (arbitrator was in
an extremely close professional relationship, arguably akin to a familial relationship, with the
attorney for one of the parties).
134. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123, 128 (e.D. Ky.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Glatzer v. Diamond, 187 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Bell v. Campbell, 143
S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
138. Glatzer v. Diamond, 187 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Sup. Ct. 1959)..
139. Bell v. Campbell, 143 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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8. Bias May Exist Where the Arbitrator Expresses His or Her
Opinion Before the Award is Rendered.
When an arbitrator expresses his or her opinion regarding the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding before the final decision is made,
this expression may be grounds for vacating the arbitration award."'
Losing parties sometimes accuse an arbitrator of having been biased by
recalling the arbitrator's "off the record" remarks during the arbitration
proceedings.' 0 However, if the arbitrator makes an apparently biased "off
the record" remark to one of the parties (for instance, that the arbitrator
predicts he or she will rule for one side instead of the other),'t bias is not
necessarily proven. "s An arbitrator's role is to act affirmatively in order
to simplify and expedite the arbitration proceedings since one of the
virtues of arbitration is its speed and informality.' 46" Therefore, if the
arbitrator makes a supposedly biased comment, this comment is not
presumed to be biased as long as the arbitrator's view is one which arises
from the evidence in the conduct of the parties. "
Simply put, arbitrators must have the ability to speak about their
impressions of a dispute. "The human mind [should] not remain
suspended in a vacuum while it struggles toward a decision.""4s Remarks
made by arbitrators, therefore, are viewed as articulations of impressions
instead of impressions of bias or partiality.' 49 Arbitrators are entitled to
have tentative impressions and to articulate these impressions so long as
they are not fixed in preiudgment.' s° Consequently, while expressions of
opinion may, in certain extreme circumstances, constitute actionable bias,
it is the more common case that these expressions, and the award flowing
therefrom, go unchallenged.
142. Ballantine Books, Inc. v. Capital Dist. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962); see
also Brennan v. Stewarts' Pharmacies, Ltd., 579 P.2d 673 (Haw. 1978).
143. Ballantine Books, Inc. v. Capital Dist. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. A. M. Perlman, Inc. v. Raycrest Mills. Inc., 117 N.Y.S.2d 572 (N.Y. App. Div.
1952).
147. Ballantine Books, Inc. v. Capital Dist. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962).
148. A. M. Perlman, Inc. v. Raycrest Mills, Inc., 117 N.Y.S.2d 572, 576 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1952).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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V. DEALING WITH ARBITRATOR BIAS
Personal and contractual bias are, of course, quite divergent.
Personal bias is rooted in psychological theory and the" personal beliefs of
the arbitrator, while contextual bias exists only when certain facts are
present in a particular arbitration proceeding. Because of its
psychological, rather than factual, character, personal bias is more
difficult to identify than contextual bias and is accordingly more difficult,
if not impossible, to remedy.
A. Personal Bias
1. The Apparent Inability to Exclude Personal Bias From
Arbitration Proceedings.
Personal biases emerge in arbitration settings more readily than in
formal adjudicatory settingsY' This is because our formal judicial system
has incorporated the societal norm of fairness into its proceedings while
our arbitration system has not. This norm of fairness is exemplified by
the presence of the American flag, the black-robed judges, and the rules
of procedure. This norm of fairness curtails the presence of bias in the
courtroom.5 3 Arbitration proceedings, oi the other hand, possess few of
these safeguards and are consequently a better breeding ground for bias.
Because of its informal setting, arbitration more easily allows participants,
notably arbitrators, to inject their emotional and behavioral biases into the
proceedings.'5 4
2. The Attempted Eradication of Personal Bias.
As shown, personal bias is more likely to appear in informal
arbitration proceedings than in formal adjudication. To eradicate this
problem one must again refer to psychological theory. Some
psychologists advocate increased social contact among minority and ethnic
groups as a means of ridding an individual of his or her bias against these
groups.-- Sometimes this strategy fails, however, and intensified
prejudice resultsY5
If increased contact is to reduce prejudice, however, it is important
151. Delgado, supra note 7, at 1391.
152. ALLPORT, supra note 90, at 462.
153. Id.
154. Delgado, supra note 7. at 1391.
155. Id. at 1385.
156. Id. at 1386.
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that three conditions are met. First, the majority and minority groups
must be equal in status. Second, each of the groups must perceive this
increased contact as rewarding instead of as antagonistic. Finally, this
contact must be intimate and personal.1 s7  Whether these methods of
reducing bias will work, of course, depends on the individual, or
individuals, in question.
3. The Proper Reaction to Perceived Personal Bias in an
Arbitration Proceeding.
Unfortunately, the above-mentioned steps toward dispelling personal
bias are generally inapplicable to an arbitration proceeding. The purpose
of an arbitration proceeding is to solve the immediate dispute between the
parties, not to study and remedy any personal biases inherent to the
arbitrators. Consequently, another method of addressing bias is necessary
in an arbitration context.
Generally speaking, a person acting upon their bias or prejudice will
not realize they are acting upon this belief. If they do in fact realize the
impetus of their actions, it is unlikely they will confess to such bias or
prejudice. Moreover, if a party to an arbitration proceeding suspects an
arbitrator is acting in a biased or partial manner, it is very difficult, if not
impossible, for the party to indicate this fact to the arbitrator so that the
arbitrator may excuse himself or herself. Typically, there is never
concrete nor specific evidence of personal bias other than the beliefs of
the party against whom this alleged prejudice is directed. Despite the
reliability and probable accuracy of this party's beliefs, however, these
beliefs constitute nothing more than intangible items of proof.'s3
Furthermore, if the existence of bias is indicated and the arbitrator
is willing to listen to the party's accusation, it is unlikely that the
arbitrator will alter his or her well-practiced beliefs and reshape his or her
conduct for purposes of the instant arbitration. More likely, the accused
arbitrator will react against his or her accuser. Consequently, accusations
of personal bias may have additional adverse effects toward the party
against whom the prejudice was originally directed.
The safer route, and more effective approach to addressing
arbitrator bias, is for the affected party, after evidence of personal bias
has been intuitively established, to compile as much specific proof of bias
as possible prior to the close of the arbitration proceedings. This way, if
157. Id.
158. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1487 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ronwin v. Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 447 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983); Foley Co. v. Grindsted
Prod., Inc., 662 P.2d 1254 (Kan. 1983); Kauffman v. Haas, 318 N.W.2d 572 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
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the party against whom the prejudice is directed loses the arbitration based
on vhat he or she believes to be. a bias-induced decision, this party has a
record upon which a reviewing court can vacate the biased arbitration
panel's award.
Another remedy may simply be for the concerned disputant to
choose traditional litigation instead of arbitration. This way, the minority
disputant need not fear subjecting himself or herself to the behavior of a
biased or prejudiced arbitrator!"
B. Contextual Bias
Contextual bias is much easier to eradicate than personal bias.
Contextual bias is easily addressed, and it need never taint an arbitration
proceeding." 0  The remedy for contextual bias is typically simple
disclosure.'61 Before accepting appointment as an arbitrator, an appointee
should carefully consider all the past relationships he or she has had with
either of the parties or their attorney, if any."62 Moreover, the careful and
responsible arbitrator should inquire into whether any members of his or
her firm, employer, or clients have had dealings with either of the parties
or attorneys to the immediate dispute."' If any questionable relationships
exist, the arbitrator should disclose these facts to the parties.' 64 Only in
this way can the arbitrator ensure that the award will not be vacated due
to contextual bias. Where the arbitrator does not disclose potential bias,
the award may well be subject to reversal and the advantages of this type
of informal, streamlined adjudication will have been thwarted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arbitration contributes significantly to reducing court congestion,
costs, and delays, and it diminishes the financial and emotional costs of
litigation for the parties.' 6s  Arbitration's ability to fulfill this potential,
however, is critically dependent on its arbitrators remaining fair and
unbiased. Bias is far less likely to exist in a courtroom setting, but the
159. Delgado, supra note 7, at 1361.
160. Id:
161. Stipanowich. supra note 5, at 1023. With respect to contextual bias which exists
due to an arbitrator acting as an advocate for one of the.parties, the remedy is to choose the
AAA procedure for selecting an arbitration panel.
162. Pantle, supra note 48. at 865.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See generally Hensler, supra note 1, at 275.
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increased cost of formal adjudication forces many disputants toward
arbitration. If two parties are going to choose arbitration, they need to
pay attention to the very real problem of bias.
Arbitration must remain neutral to survive.'" If the parties fail to
get a fair and unbiased decision, it will not only be the parties who lose -
the system will lose as well. 1' If arbitration is to serve its purpose,
arbitration awards must not be reviewed by a court. If they are reviewed,
the litigants will end up spending more time and energy litigating their
cause than if it had gone to formal adjudication from the beginning.
Surely, this is not the intent of the system.
In order to prevent this misapplication, arbitrators must be careful
to be fair. If an arbitrator is personally biased with respect to certain
racial or ethnic groups, this arbitrator must disqualify himself or herself
from the proceedings. If an arbitrator has had prior relations with one of
the parties, the arbitrator must disclose this fact. The system will not be
used by litigants in future cases if it fails to deliver this essential product -
justice.1"6 Only by eliminating bias will arbitration serve as an effective
and lasting method of alternative dispute resolution.
Daniel R. Karon
166. Hartgering, supra note 2, at 44.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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